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We describe how recent advances in stem cell research may be interpreted by various regulatory regimes
and use Canada as a model to demonstrate how broad-based prohibitive legislation can unintentionally
restrict research direction. We encourage scientists and policymakers to collaborate to ensure a clear regu-
latory framework that accommodates future advances.Cell Stemfunding restrictions for stem cell research,
and the senate is scheduled to debate
stem cell legislation imminently.
The Importance of Definition:
Embryos versus Hybrids
The legal statusofembryocreation through
SCNT divides the world. Some jurisdic-
tions, notably the UK, Australia, South
Korea, and California, permit the proce-
dure, while others, including Germany
and Canada, prohibit it. In Canada, the
prohibition comes with a potential 5–10
year prison sentence.
Creating SCNT embryos for stem cell
derivation is one route toward patient-
specific therapies. However, the process
remains extremely inefficient, and the
need for oocytes remains a significant
barrier. To circumvent the oocyte
shortage dilemma, scientists have turned
to iSCNT, which involves using nonhuman
oocytes as a receptacle for the human
nucleus (Beyhan et al., 2007). But is the
iSCNT procedure legal? In Canada, iSCNT
creations fit within the legal definition of
a hybrid: ‘‘non-human ovum into which
the nucleus of any human cell has been
introduced’’ (Canada, 2004). Despite the
ban on human-to-human SCNT, creation
of human-animal hybrids for research
purposes is explicitly allowed, provided
such creations are not used reproduc-
tively. Furthermore, although manipula-
tion of the somatic donor cell (defined as
human reproductive material in the Act)embryos and from embryos generated
from isolated blastomeres (Ogbogu and
Rugg-Gunn, 2008). Most, if not all, of
these techniques were not contemplated
during the political debates that led to
the current regulatory environment.
This Forum article examines the chal-
lenge of drafting legislation in a changing
scientific climate by asking how these
emerging technologies fit within existing
international regulatory regimes. We
believe that regulatory uncertainties
created by these new techniques demon-
strate the limitations placed on stem cell
research by prohibitive regulation. Our
primary example is Canadian legislation,
which occupies a middle ground between
generally permissive regimes (such as
the United Kingdom [UK], Singapore, and
the state of California) and restrictive
regimes (such as Germany and Italy).
This approach allows us to examine key
features of both regulatory extremes
by drawing on a compromise position.
However, the challenge of drafting legal
frameworks in a changing scientific envi-
ronment is fundamental to all countries
with stem cell research policies, irrespec-
tive of the overlying level of permissive-
ness. Raising this discussion now is
extremely timely. The Canadian Parlia-
ment is scheduled to revisit the relevant
legislation, The Assisted Human Repro-
duction Act (the Act), in 2009. Also, recent
changes in the United States (US) political
landscape have led to lifting of federalIntroduction
There is a policy cliche´ stating that the law
lags behind science and is limping a little.
There is no doubt that the speed of scien-
tific advances can outpace the often
sloth-like tempo of the political and legis-
lative process. In Canada, for example,
the reproductive technologies legislation
that also governs embryonic stem cell
(ESC) research came into force a decade
after the publication of the Royal Commis-
sion that called for its enactment.
But the law is also often a terribly blunt
and clumsy policy tool. It not only lags
behind the advances of science but can
create unintended hurdles in front of it.
Legislation can quickly become an anach-
ronism, no longer reflecting the social
mood or scientific realities. If scientific
legislation is crafted without careful atten-
tion to the underlying science, it may run
aground when faced with new scientific
realities.
Nowhere are the struggles of law more
apparent than in stem cell research—an
area in which intense social controversy
has led to legislative actions throughout
the world (Isasi and Knoppers, 2006). At
the same time, new approaches to
creating stem cell lines have emerged,
some to circumvent challenges posed in
adopting human ESCs (hESCs). Notable
new techniques include interspecies
somatic cell nuclear transfer (iSCNT),
induced pluripotent stem (iPS) cells, and
ESCs derived from parthenogeneticCell 4, April 3, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc. 285
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the outcome of this procedure is defined
as a hybrid and not an embryo, this tech-
nique may fall completely outside the
established regulatory regime. Therefore,
not only does iSCNT creation appear
legal, but a researcher may not even need
to obtain a license to conduct these
studies in Canada.
It is important to note that our view that
iSCNT is legal in Canada is far from
certain. The Act bans SCNT, cloning, and
creating embryos for research. Since an
embryo is defined in the Act as ‘‘a human
organism in the first 56 days of develop-
ment following fertilization or creation,’’
regulators could advance the claim that
iSCNT creations are embryos because
they contain human nuclei—and their
creation would therefore be criminally pro-
hibited. Although possible, we believe this
interpretation leaves room for ambiguity
surrounding the level of human content
required for iSCNT creations to be termed
embryos and is less persuasive than the
more explicit definitions in the Act that
distinguish between hybrid and embryo
(Ogbogu et al., 2008).
If iSCNT creations are allowed, this
permissive stance would create the odd
policy paradox whereby Canada now
has one of the strictest regulations on
SCNT and one of the most liberal on
iSCNT. This paradox is heightened when
one considers that Australia, a nation
that shares many of Canada’s sociopolit-
ical ideals, allows SCNT but criminally
prohibits iSCNT research. Australian
legislation allows the licensed creation of
hybrid embryos only by mixing animal
oocytes and human sperm, and only for
the purpose of testing sperm quality in
an accredited facility. The creation of
hybrid embryos by any other means or
for any other purpose comes with a 10
year potential prison sentence (Australia,
2002).
Both practices are, without doubt,
controversial. Public opinion research
(conducted in the UK) indicates that a
greater proportion of the public views
creation and use of iSCNT embryos with
concern, as compared to conventional
SCNT (Human Fertilisation and Embry-
ology Authority, 2007). Given the conser-
vative ethos that permeated Canadian
parliamentary debates leading up to
enactment of the legislation (Caulfield
and Bubela, 2007), it seems hard to286 Cell Stem Cell 4, April 3, 2009 ª2009 Elsbelieve that the current state of affairs
was intended.
Much of the motivation for the restric-
tions in the Act flowed from a conventional
view of how a human embryo is
created—that is, by methods involving
the use of human reproductive material.
By adopting a view that the embryo
possessed moral status, Canadian legis-
lators justified a ban on embryo creation
for stem cell derivation. Indeed, relevant
parliamentary debates focused on the
moral status of embryos and the dangers
of human cloning (Caulfield and Bubela,
2007). When the Act was drafted, creation
of human-animal hybrids was not
canvassed as a method of deriving stem
cells and therefore not subject to the
same oversight. There is no documentary
evidence to suggest that legislators
considered derivation of stem cells from
hybrids, or that they felt this technique
was less controversial because it does
not require human oocytes. Given the
state of science at the time of the political
debates, and the lack of reference to
hybrids in parliamentary transcripts, it is
more likely that the use of hybrids in this
current context was not contemplated.
Regulatory uncertainty surrounding
SCNT and its derivatives is not unique to
Canada. The legal status of SCNT in the
UK was challenged in a 2001 case
brought on behalf of the ProLife Alliance,
a group opposed to all forms of cloning
and research on embryos. ProLife
claimed that the definition of embryo in
the UK Human Fertilisation and Embry-
ology (HFE) Act did not extend to SCNT-
created embryos. This claim, if success-
ful, would have excluded SCNT from the
licensing and regulatory scheme estab-
lished by the HFE Act, thus creating
a legislative lacuna for SCNT-derived
embryos. The lower court’s ruling in favor
of the claim was overturned in an appeal
affirmed by the House of Lords, which
concluded that the intent of the HFE Act
is to regulate in vitro embryos regardless
of mode of creation, including embryos
created by technologies that were unfore-
seen at the time of enactment.
Definitional ambiguities notwith-
standing, UK legislation has proved
responsive to change. The spirit of the
House of Lords decision described above
was reflected in recent amendments to
the HFE Act, which includes updated defi-
nitions seeking to clarify the legal status ofevier Inc.novel creations discussed within this
article. In contrast to the Canadian legisla-
tive model and its emphasis on prohibi-
tions, UK legislation brings new embryonic
technologies into a permissive regulatory
scheme based on licensing and oversight.
While the UK model deserves credit for
providing a framework with enduring rele-
vance, regulators have shown some
unease in giving practical effect to the
legislative and regulatory scheme. For
example, UK regulators recently sought
public opinion on the implications of
licensing research involving interspecies
hybrids, a move that was criticized by
many as an abdication of the legislative
mandate to make decisions in the spirit
of the HFE Act (Ogbogu et al., 2008).
The reasons for the different regulatory
approaches are, no doubt, complex.
Jurisdictions have diverse legal, cultural,
and historical contexts that inform policy
development. Timing of regulation also
seems important. The UK HFE Act was
introduced before human stem cell
research became a significant field of
study. In Canada, however, the law was
debated and introduced at the height of
human cloning and embryo controver-
sies, lending rhetorical support for
a prohibitive approach (Caulfield and
Bubela, 2007).
Stem Cells Derived from Nonviable
Embryos
To minimize the ethical stigma associated
with stem cell derivation from viable
human embryos, novel approaches have
been described in proof-of-principle
studies. We discuss two of the most
promising and suggest that although the
techniques may not harm viable embryos,
they are unlikely to be afforded less-
restrictive regulation than their conven-
tionally derived counterparts.
The first technique involves deriving
stem cells from parthenogenetic
embryos, which are known to be nonvi-
able in mice because a defined paternal
genetic contribution is necessary to
complete development (Kawahara et al.,
2007; McGrath and Solter, 1984; Surani
et al., 1984). The results of these studies
are supported in humans, in which natu-
rally occurring parthenogenetic activation
of an egg results in disorganized develop-
ment leading to benign ovarian teratomas
(Linder and Power, 1970). The second
derivation technique involves extracting
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stage embryo and coaxing the isolated
cell to develop into a blastocyst, from
which stem cells can be derived (Chung
et al., 2008). Blastocysts formed from
single blastomeres extracted from eight
cell mouse or primate embryos cannot
complete development even when
implanted into a surrogate host (Chan
et al., 2000; Rossant, 1976). Since human
embryos blastulate at a similar stage to
mouse and primate, current scientific
evidence indicates that embryos gener-
ated from single human blastomeres are
also nonviable.
Our interpretation of Canadian legisla-
tion is that both techniques would be
treated as creating an embryo for research
purposes and would therefore be pro-
hibited. However, this conclusion is not
certain, because the term ‘‘embryo’’ is
loosely defined in the Act as ‘‘a human
organism in the first 56 days of develop-
ment following fertilization or creation’’
with no guidance on whether nonviable
embryos are excluded from the definition.
In addition, a parthenogenetic embryo is
likely to be considered a clone because
all genetic material originated from a single
individual, the oocyte donor. A ruling of
this nature would re-enforce a ban on the
creation of parthenogenetic embryos.
Was this outcome intended at the time
of enactment and/or consistent with the
goals of the Act? It can be argued that
since the Act seeks to control reproductive
processes and their effect on specific pop-
ulations (women and children), it cannot
legitimately apply to nonviable creations
that can never result in reproduction.
Reproductive use of such creations could
be expressly outlawed, so why was no
consideration given to a more permissive
stance on creation of nonviable entities
for research? It seems likely that constant
focus on ‘‘moral status’’ in parliamentary
debates leading to the enactment resulted
in lack of understanding of the impact this
broad ban would have on future stem cell
research. It can also be argued that
omnibus legislation, such as the Canadian
Act, which groups together multiple
complex issues including regulation of
fertility clinics, gamete donation, surro-
gacy, and using embryos for research, is
more likely to be prone to inconsistencies
and contradictions.
How is the derivation of stem cells from
nonviable embryos regulated in otherjurisdictions? In the UK, Australia, and
the commonwealth of Massachusetts,
creation of embryos from single blasto-
meres is expressly allowed for research.
Australia and Massachusetts also permit
creation of parthenogenetic embryos. In
the UK, it is unclear whether the HFE Act
regulates parthenogenetic embryos. The
current version of the HFE Act defines
an embryo as ‘‘an egg that is in the
process of fertilisation or [that] is under-
going any other process capable of result-
ing in an embryo.’’ Although this definition
seems circular, it appears to be
commonly accepted that the intent of
the legislation is to cover all in vitro
embryos (Lovell-Badge, 2008), no matter
how created. It seems, therefore, that
parthenogenetic embryos might be
covered by the regulatory scheme
provided by the HFE Act.
A New Frontier—Somatic Cells
and Induced Pluripotency
Even among staunch critics of SCNT and
ESCs, recent successful reprogramming
of somatic cells into iPS cells has been
lauded as an ethically appropriate tech-
nique of stem cell derivation. However,
advances in iPS cell research could yield
equally weighty ethical considerations. It
may be possible to differentiate human
iPS cells into sperm and oocytes, and
thereby in theory, a single individual could
be both mother and father to a child. The
individual does not even need to be living
if there is a stored sample of their cells.
With respect to legality, iPS cell genera-
tion is either unregulated or permitted in
most jurisdictions, including those with
restrictive policies on SCNT and embryo
research. However, there are interesting
caveats. A number of jurisdictions ban
alteration of the genome of a human cell
if the alterations are heritable. All human
iPS cells that have been generated so far
contain altered genomes due to integra-
tion of the reprogramming factors.
Furthermore, since ESCs can generate
cells that resemble germ cells (Tilgner
et al., 2008), it is likely that iPS cells also
have this capacity, thus providing a theo-
retical method of transmitting a genome
alteration. In Australia, the relevant legal
provision states that the person altering
the genome must have ‘‘intended the
alteration to be heritable by descendants
of the human whose cell was altered’’
(Australia, 2002). Therefore, AustralianCell Stem Clegislation permits iPS cell differentiation
into germ cells for research purposes.
In contrast, Canadian legislation
appears to ban differentiation of human
iPS cells into germ cells altogether. The
Canadian position is likely to be an unin-
tended consequence of the ban on germ-
line genetic alteration, as creating germ
cells from genetically altered somatic cells
was not discussed during drafting of the
Act. Moreover, the likely harm raised by
germline genetic alteration is transmitting
modified hereditary traits to offspring,
a possibility that could not arise directly
from the alteration of somatic cells. Argu-
ably, legislative provision preventing
reproductive use of altered iPS cells differ-
entiated into germ cells would be suffi-
ciently preventative. However, the
Canadian provision explicitly bans any
alteration—whether for reproductive
purposes or not—if the alteration is
‘‘capable’’ of being passed to offspring.
Generating iPS cells without genome alter-
ation using direct protein delivery, chemi-
cal modifiers, or nonintegrating expres-
sion constructs could circumvent this ban.
Conclusion
Drafting wide-ranging legislation to regu-
late a field as dynamic and socially
controversial as stem cell research is an
extremely challenging task. The pace of
scientific discovery, combined with the
need for scientists to probe new research
directions, will result in continuous testing
of the limits of any legislation.
We believe that the experience in
Canada highlights several lessons that
have relevance for any jurisdiction strug-
gling to develop science policy. First,
there is great need for ongoing scientific
input to law and policy making, especially
in providing accurate knowledge and
information about technical aspects of
research. This is not to say that the scien-
tific perspective should dominate, but
that, regardless of one’s view on the
ethical appropriateness of research tech-
niques, the debate should be properly
informed. As such, engaging the policy-
makers should be an ongoing priority for
the scientific community. Canadian stem
cell scientists have an opportunity to influ-
ence future legislative amendments by
ensuring that their interests and positions
are taken into account in the upcoming
parliamentary review. In doing so, it may
prove prudent to ‘‘strategically avoidell 4, April 3, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc. 287
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science’’ (Nisbet and Mooney, 2007),
sticking instead to broad principles and
clarity of language that promotes better
understanding of the matters at stake.
Second, researchers should highlight the
challenges associated with restrictive and
inflexible legislation and emphasize the
advantages of regulatory guidelines that
allowrapid response toscientificadvances.
Again, whetheroneadvocates acautious or
more permissive approach to regulation, it
is important to craft legislative provisions
that retain the ability to capture the nuances
and unpredictable turns inevitably associ-
ated with scientific progress.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly,
it is imperative that science policy be
founded on clear, transparent principles
that will have enduring relevance—
regardless of where the science takes
us. The specific principles must be stated
explicitly, such that new developments
can be openly considered within that
context. Through this process, legislation
can comprehensively regulate research
while ensuring a clear and fair framework
for future scientific advances.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Research and preparation of this work was funded
by a grant from the Canadian Stem Cell Network.288 Cell Stem Cell 4, April 3, 2009 ª2009 ElsWe thank Laura Geddes, Colin Ouellette, and
Michael Sharp for research assistance. P.J.R.-G.
is a Canadian Institutes of Health Research
(CIHR) Bisby Fellow, and U.O. holds a Social
Sciences and Humanities Research Council
(SSHRC) Joseph Armand-Bombardier Doctoral
Scholarship.
WEB RESOURCES
Australia. (2002). Prohibition of Human Cloning
for Reproduction Act 2002: Act No. 144 of
2002 as amended (http://www.nhmrc.gov.au/
publications/synopses/_files/prohibit.pdf).
Canada (2004). Assisted Human Reproduction
Act, c. 2 (http://www.laws.justice.gc.ca/en/
A-13.4).
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority
(2007). Hybrids and Chimeras: Findings of the
Consultation, Appendix F – Public Dialogue:
Opinion Poll (http://www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/
2007-09-05_Authority_Paper_Hybrids_Chimeras__
Findings_of_the_Consultation_396_Annex_F.pdf).
United Kingdom. (1990). Human Fertilisation and
Embryology Act 1990, c. 37 (http://www.opsi.
gov.uk/Acts/acts1990/ukpga_19900037_en_1);
amended as Human Fertilisation and Embry-
ology Act 2008, c. 22 (http://www.opsi.gov.uk/
acts/acts2008/ukpga_20080022_en_1).
REFERENCES
Beyhan, Z., Iager, A.E., and Cibelli, J.B. (2007). Cell
Stem Cell 1, 502–512.
Caulfield, T., and Bubela, T. (2007). Am. J. Bioeth.
7, 51–61.evier Inc.Chan, A.W., Dominko, T., Luetjens, C.M., Neuber,
E., Martinovich, C., Hewitson, L., Simerly, C.R.,
and Schatten, G.P. (2000). Science 287, 317–319.
Chung, Y., Klimanskaya, I., Becker, S., Li, T.,
Maserati, M., Lu, S.J., Zdravkovic, T., Ilic, D., Gen-
bacev, O., Fisher, S., et al. (2008). Cell Stem Cell 2,
113–117.
Isasi, R.M., and Knoppers, B.M. (2006). Eur. J.
Health Law 13, 9–25.
Kawahara, M., Wu, Q., Takahashi, N., Morita, S.,
Yamada, K., Ito, M., Ferguson-Smith, A.C., and
Kono, T. (2007). Nat. Biotechnol. 25, 1045–1050.
Linder, D., and Power, J. (1970). Ann. Hum. Genet.
34, 21–30.
Lovell-Badge, R. (2008). Natl. Rev. 9, 998–1003.
McGrath, J., and Solter, D. (1984). Cell 37, 179–
183.
Nisbet, M.C., and Mooney, C. (2007). Science
316, 56.
Ogbogu, U., and Rugg-Gunn, P. (2008). J. Int.
Biotechnol. Law 5, 186–199.
Ogbogu, U., Caulfield, T., and Green, S. (2008).
Med. Law Int. 9, 227–244.
Rossant, J. (1976). J. Embryol. Exp. Morphol. 36,
283–290.
Surani, M.A., Barton, S.C., and Norris, M.L. (1984).
Nature 308, 548–550.
Tilgner, K., Atkinson, S.P., Golebiewska, A., Stoj-
kovic, M., Lako, M., and Armstrong, L. (2008).
Stem Cells 26, 3075–3086.
